Somalia’s Endless Arms Embargo: UNSC Resolutions 2775 & 2776 (2025)

Countering the arms race

In a span of few days, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) once again extended Somalia’s arms embargo through resolutions 2775 and 2776, on 28^th February, 2025 and 3^rd March, 2025, respectively. Resolution 2775 focused on reauthorizing maritime interdiction to enforce the arms embargo on Somalia, while Resolution 2776 extended the Al-Shabaab sanctions regime and renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts. These latest resolutions build upon the framework established by Resolution 2662 (2022), which renewed the sanctions regime on Somalia, including the partial easing of the arms embargo, reaffirmation of the charcoal and improvised explosive devices (IED) components bans, and the extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Somalia until December 2023. The goal of these resolutions is to curb the flow of weapons into Somalia, especially Al-Shabaab and other armed groups that destabilize the country. However, under this official pretext is deeper geopolitical struggles that shape Somalia’s security landscape and has done so for over three decades.

The embargo was first imposed in 1992 via Resolution 733, during the brutal Somali Civil War, and is notably one of the longest running arms restrictions in modern history. Although the restrictions have been modified over time to allow the Somali government to import weapons under strict conditions, the core of the embargo remains intact. The idea behind this is clear: an unchecked arms flow could destabilize Somalia further and have ripple effects across the Horn of Africa and beyond.

Nevertheless, in practice, the embargo has failed to prevent weapons from reaching Al-Shabaab, and hasn’t led to long term stability either, as confirmed by various reports from UN monitoring groups. Instead, it has locked Somalia in a cycle of dependency on external security forces and has reinforced foreign influence over its military and governance.

So, is the arms embargo truly about security or a tool for geopolitical control?

Arms embargos are political tools wielded by powerful states and not just technical restrictions. Historically, arms control measures have often been used to shaper power dynamics rather than prevent violence outright.

After World War II, Germany and Japan were demilitarized to prevent future conflicts, but both quickly rearmed after they became strategic allies against the Soviet Union. A prolonged arms embargo sanction on Iraq from 1990s to 2003 did weaken its army but did not remove Saddam Hussein from power, eventually leading to the U.S. led invasion. In the case of Libya, the disarmament and NATO intervention in 2011 led Muammar Gaddafi to dismantling his weapons program due to international pressure, only to be left vulnerable when NATO-backed rebels overthrew him. These cases of Germany, Japan, Iraq, and Libya illustrate how Western approaches to disarmament and rearmament shift based on strategic interests rather than serving as direct parallels to Somalia.

Somalia serves as a strategic location along the Gulf of Aden which makes it a valuable geopolitical prize and any shifts in its military capability could disrupt the balance of power in the region.

The U.S supports maintaining the embargo under the justification of keeping Al-Shabaab at bay. American special forces operations, drone strikes, and military training programs all operate under this framework. However, Washington’s interests go beyond counterterrorism, keeping Somalia dependent on American security assistance and ensure continued influence over the country’s military and political decisions.

Both Kenya and Ethiopia have deployed troops in Somalia under the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), now replaced by African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) as part of the African Union mandate to fight Al-Shabaab. Officially, their role is to stabilize the region, but their long-term presence also serves their own national interest. If Somalia is heavily armed, it could challenge Kenya and Ethiopia’s influence in the region, especially where territorial disputes and political tensions persist.

The Gulf states, particularly the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia have competing interests in Somalia and the Red Sea corridor, often aligning with local factions due to the region’s strategic proximity to major shipping lanes.During the Somali Civil War, the Gulf states took up a humanitarian role by helping the people, building schools and financially supporting teachers. Somalia is a constituent of the Arab League and shares religious and cultural ties with the Arab peninsula. The Gulf players have been able to circumvent the restrictions around the arms embargo, which limits who can legally supply weapons by backing Somali factions that are aligned with their interests. That said, lifting the embargo could lead to an influx of Gulf funded arms, shifting regional power dynamics.

Somalia, as a non-permanent member of the UNSC for the 2025-2026 term, voted in favour of Resolutions 2775 (2025) and 2776 (2025). Its support likely stemmed from a commitment to combating terrorism, securing international aid, and maintaining cooperation with global partners. Backing these resolutions aligned with Somalia’s broader goal of enhancing security and stability while safeguarding continued international assistance, from key partners namely, U.S., UK, and EU for its reconstruction efforts.

However, one of the biggest contradictions of the embargo is that while it restricts the Somali government’s military capacity, it does not stop Al-Shabaab from acquiring weapons. Al-Shabaab has consistently obtained weapons through illicit trade routes, often from Yemen and other regional sources. Reports have indicated that weapons and military equipment meant for the Somali security forces, have ended up with Al-Shabaab due to corruption or battlefield losses. The very trade that the embargo is supposed to prevent, is what Al-Shabaab is profiting from as they do not need to import the weapons themselves but merely tax those who do.

The embargo risks creating an imbalance that favors non-state actors over the legitimate government by limiting the Somali government’s access to weapons while failing to disrupt Al-Shabaab’s supply chains. Some elements of alternatives exist, but are often fragmented and undermined by competing interest. Instead of blanket restrictions and indefinite extension of the embargo, the UNSC could implement a monitored process where Somalia regains control of its arms supply in phases, with clear accountability mechanisms. If the concern is weapons proliferation, broader arms control agreements involving Ethiopia, Kenya, and Gulf states could help prevent a regional arms race. More investment in intelligence-sharing, counterterrorism funding, and governance reforms could also achieve better security outcomes than simply restricting arms. The question lies on whether or not these processes could be adhered to. Somalia is both protected and constrained, unable to fully arm itself but also not completely disarmed, due to the embargo.

The extension of the embargo reveals a broader struggle over who gains control over the country’s future and not just about security. It emphasizes the double standards of the international arms control, where some states are allowed to develop their militaries freely while others remain constrained under the guise of stability. It also reflects geopolitical power imbalances, where security concerns override sovereignty and self-reliance.

What’s next for Somalia?

Somalia’s fragile federal system risks further fragmentation if the arms embargo is lifted. Regional states like Puntland and Jubaland could expand their own forces, challenging the federal government’s authority. Without oversight, an arms influx may fuel competition rather than strengthening national security. Maintaining international oversight on arms flows enables Somalia to prioritize institutional reform, governance, and military discipline before expanding its arsenal.

For Somalia, the embargo is both a lifeline and a noose. While it limits the government's ability to fully rearm, it also guarantees international support and oversight. The real question isn’t whether the embargo should end, but when and under what conditions Somalia can responsibly manage its own security without risking relapse into chaos.

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About the Author: Jasleen Gill is an International Relations graduate with a minor in Criminal Justice and concentration in Peace and Conflict studies, with a strong focus on security, diplomacy, and conflict resolution. Passionate about global governance, humanitarian action, and intelligence analysis, she explores the dynamics of war, peacebuilding, and international security, with a particular interest in Africa’s evolving role in global affairs.

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